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AN ANALYSIS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
AND THE GETTYSBURG TOWER CASE
INTRODUCTION
As the pleasant Pennsylvania countryside within the tri-
angle of the Alleghenies, the Susquehanna and the Mary-
land line provided the site for the maneuvers of two great
armies in the last days of June 1863, and as the fields
around Gettysburg provided the place for the decisive
three first days of July of that year, this lawsuit is a test-
ing ground of important and fundamental interests, one
old the other new, in serious conflict."
The older of the conflicting interests alluded to by Justice Rog-
ers in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc.2 is the familiar right of property owners to use their land as
they please, "provided they do not interfere with their neighbors'
reasonable enjoyment of their properties and subject to reasonable
regulations for the public good imposed under the police power of
the State .. "3
The newer of the conflicting interests is a right which many
people believe to be equally fundamental, the right to a reason-
ably safe and pleasant environment. Crystallized as the Environ-
mental Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, this
recently emerged interest is stated as follows:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, in-
cluding generations yet to come. As trustee of these re-
sources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.
4
The lawsuit which was to provide the great testing ground for
the conflicting interests arose over the desire of National Gettys-
1. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 231, 233, 302 A.2d 886, 887, ajf'd, 454 Pa. 193, 311
A.2d 588 (1973).
2. Id.
3. Id. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides in part: "All men . .. have
certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are . . .possessing
and protecting property .. "; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 states: "[N]or
shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority
of law and without just compensation being first made or secured."
4. PA. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
burg Battlefield Tower, Inc. and its individual principals 5 to use its
land for the construction of a 307 foot high tower adjacent to the
Gettysburg National Military Park. The Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, through its Governor and Attorney General, brought suit
against the Tower Corporation alleging that the tower would vio-
late the citizens' newly acquired rights, and that as trustee of
those rights, the Commonwealth had the duty to protect themA
In order to fulfill its claimed duty, the Commonwealth sought to
forever enjoin the construction of the tower.
7
Judge MacPhail, the presiding judge of the trial court, agreed
that the amendment was self-executing and therefore created new
and important rights for the citizens of Pennsylvania," and that
the plaintiffs were the proper parties to assert the trust created
for the protection of the public resources. 9 However, the court
held that the Commonwealth had failed to prove irrepairable harm
to the environment and therefore it was not entitled to injunctive
relief.10
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's
disposition of the case.'1 In a concurring and dissenting opinion,
Judge Mencer argued that the New Amendment was not self-
executing, and, therefore, was no more than a policy statement,
which was without legal effect in the absence of enabling legisla-
tion. 2
From the Commonwealth Court, the Commonwealth appealed
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 13 Judge O'Brien, writing
the opinion of the court, held that the amendment was not self-
executing. 14 Two justices concurred in the result but stated their
inability to find any error in either the chancellor's determination
or that of the Commonwealth Court.' 5 Two justices dissented,
claiming not only that the amendment was self-executing but also
that the Commonwealth had met its burden of proof; and there-
fore, the construction of the tower should be enjoined.' 6 Justice
5. Hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Tower Corporation."
See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa.
193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
6. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
7. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13
Adams L.J. 75 (Pa. C.P. 1971), aff'd, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 231, 302
A.2d 886, aff'd, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
8. Id. at 79-80.
9. Id. at 80-81.
10. Id. at 83.
11. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 231, 302 A.2d 886 (1973).
12. Id. at 250, 302 A.2d at 895 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
13. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
14. Id. at 205, 311 A.2d at 595.
15. Id. at 206, 311 A.2d at 595 (concurring opinion).
16. Id. at 208, 311 A.2d at 596 (dissenting opinion).
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Nix concurred in the result without comment. 17 Clearly, the law-
suit which was to provide the testing ground for the amendment
has raised as many questions as it has answered.
This Comment will first examine the Environmental Rights
Amendment itself and the issue of whether the amendment is self-
executing. Arguments which have been advanced as to why the
amendment cannot be self-executing will be examined in some de-
tail.
Next, the likely effect of the amendment on governmental ac-
tions will be examined. If the amendment was self-executing only
to the extent of reserving rights in the people not to be abridged
by the government, then the amendment could still have an im-
portant effect by restraining governmental acts which tend to un-
reasonably destroy the qualities of the environment.
However, it will be shown that the amendment likely imposed
the public trust doctrine on the management of Pennsylvania's nat-
ural resources. This doctrine will be explored, demonstrating that
in certain cases the doctrine is already part of the Pennsylvania
law, and that the amendment has expanded the subject matter to
which that body of law is applicable.
Next the implications of the amendment on acts of private in-
dividuals will be examined. It will be submitted that in this area
the public trust doctrine has some limitations, and that an action
such as Gettysburg is a proper exercise of that doctrine only if the
amendment is construed to have created a property right in his-
toric values.
Finally, an argument will be advanced for supporting a pri-
vate cause of action in tort for violation of one's environmental
rights under the amendment.
I. WHETHER THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
IS SELF-ExEcUTING
Generally, a constitutional provision is self-executing if it re-
quires no legislation to be effective. 18 As stated in City of Shaw-
nee v. Williamson:
19
Where a Constitutional provision is complete in itself it
needs no further legislation to put it into force. And where
it asserts a certain right, or lays down a certain principle
of law or procedure it speaks for the entire people as their
17. Id. at 206, 311 A.2d at 595.
18. Id. at 199, 311 A.2d at 591; O'Neill v. White, 343 Pa. 96, 99-100,
22 A.2d 25, 26-27 (1941).
19. City of Shawnee v. Williamson, 338 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959).
supreme law and is full authority for all that is done in pur-
suance of its provision.
20
On the other hand, if it is not self-executing it has a moral
force only and is dependent upon enabling legislation to be legally
effective.
21
The ultimate goal of the courts in passing on this question "is
to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it."1
22
A constitution is usually regarded as a declaration of the
fundamental law and it is entirely within the power of
those who adopt it or amend it to make its provisions self-
executing.
23
In many provisions the intent is expressly stated.2 4  More com-
monly, however, the language does not include any express state-
ment in this regard. Furthermore, many constitutional provisions,
by their nature (for example those setting standards for taxation)
require enabling legislation before they can be enforced. In rul-
ing on provisions which contain no express statement of intent,
the courts have applied a generally accepted test in accordance
with equally well accepted rules of construction.
The generally accepted test is as follows:
A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing
if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right
given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed
may be enforced; and it is not self-executing when it
merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by
means of which those principles may be given the force of
law.25
This test or variations thereof is almost universally applied by the
courts.26 Yet, despite this basic agreement, there is often a diver-
20. Id. at 358.
21. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 454 Pa.
193, 199, 311 A.2d 588, 591 (1973).
22. American Youth Foundation v. Benona Township, 8 Mich. App.
521, 528, 154 N.W.2d 554, 558 (1967); 1 T. COOLEY, A TRxATISE ON THE
CONSTIT'UTIONAL LIMITATONs, 61 (8th ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as
COOLEY].
23. Haile v. Foote, 90 Idaho 261, 266, 409 P.2d 409, 411 (1965).
24. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
149 Neb. 507, 510, 31 N.W.2d 477, 481 (1948) ("No person shall be denied
employment because of membership in . . .a labor union .... This art-
icle is self-executing. . . ." Id.)
25. 1 COOLEY, supra note 22, at 167-68.
26. E.g., People v. Western Air Lines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 637, 268 P.2d 723,
732 (1954); Baker v. Bosworth, 122 Colo. 356, 360, 222 P.2d 416, 418 (1950);
City of Shawnee v. Williamson, 338 P.2d 355, 358 (Okla. 1959); Common-
wealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 198-99,
311 A.2d 588, 591 (1973). In Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900), the
United States Supreme Court stated:
Where a constitutional provision is complete in itself it needs no
further legislation to put it in force. When it lays down certain
general principles, as to enact laws upon a certain subject, or for
the incorporation of cities of certain population, or for uniform
laws upon the subject of taxation it may need more specific legis-
lation to make it operative. Id. at 403.
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sity of opinion as to whether a particular provision is self-execut-
ing.27  This disagreement is usually a result of the application (or
misapplication) of the equally well developed rules of construction
for interpreting constitutional provisions.
A basic rule is that one provision may be self-executing while
another is not.28 In Commonwealth v. Smith,29 the court was in-
terpreting an amendment which provided that:
No person holding .. . any office .. . under the United
States shall at the same time hold . . . any office in this
state .... The General Assembly may by law disclose
what offices are incompatible.30
The Supreme Court held the first part to be self-executing, and
in regard to the latter sentence the court stated:
Such laws have been passed from time to time, but the
power thus given to the legislature does not restrict the
operation of the first part of the section nor permit of a
legislative nullification of the inhabitation which it con-
tains (citations omitted).31
Courts also hold that the intent of the people is to be found in
the instrument itself.32 If the intent is plainly declared by that
instrument the courts are not at liberty to search elsewhere for
other possible meanings.33 It is only when there is ambiguity in
the possible intent that the courts should resort to extrinsic evi-
dence such as the legislative history of the amendment.34
Further, the language used in the provision is to be construed
in its popular sense. 5 As stated in O'Conner v. Armstrong, "[t] he
courts are not at liberty to disregard the plain meaning of words of
27. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 454 Pa.
193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973) (Compare the opinion of the court with the
concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion).
28. E.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 343 Pa. 446, 23 A.2d 440 (1940).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 450, 23 A.2d at 442.
31. Id. 1 COOLEY, supra note 22, at 169:
Rights [within a provision which is not self-executing] may lie
dormant until statutes shall provide for them, though insofar as
any distinct provision is made which by itself is capable of en-
forcement, it is law, and all supplementary legislation must be in
harmony with it.
But cf. O'Connor v. Armstrong, 299 Pa. 390, 396, 149 A. 655, 658 (1930)
(The court held that a small fraction, "inextricably tied up" in the whole
could not be self-executing by itself).
32. E.g., American Youth Foundation v. Township of Benona, 8 Mich.
App. 521, 528, 154 N.W.2d 554, 558 (1967).
33. Id.
34. 1 COOLEY, supra note 22, at 141. See Baker v. Bosworth, 122 Colo.
356, 361, 222 P.2d 416, 418 (1950).
35. Commonwealth v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 348, 161 A. 323, 324 (1932).
a constitution in order to search for some other conjectured in-
tent. .... "36
Ordinary words are to be "construed in the popular sense, as
the people who voted for it understood them."
37
Finally, provisions which are prohibitive in nature are gener-
ally regarded as self-executing."' Cooley, in A Treatise on the Con-
stitutional Limitations," states:
[T]here is a distinction between a declarative limitation of
legislative power on a given subject, within which legisla-
tion may or should be enacted, and a positive constitutional
inhibition which no legislative act can relieve or modify;
the former might require future legislation; the latter
must, from its nature, be self-executing.
40
In applying the general rules to the Environmental Rights
Amendment, it is important to note that there are two distinct
provisions. The first sentence provides that "[t] he people have a
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the nat-
ural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.*41
This provision speaks about "an affirmative right to various as-
pects of environmental quality. '42 In contrast, the latter sentences
refer to public resources and the Commonwealth's duties as trustee:
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
the people.
43
Since neither provision is "inextricably tied up with" 44 the other,
it would seem that one could be self-executing while the other is
not.45
It has been suggested that the Environmental Rights Amend-
36. O'Conner v. Armstrong, 299 Pa. 390, 395, 149 A. 655, 657 (1930).
37. Commonwealth v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 348, 161 A. 323, 324 (1932).
38. Commonwealth v. Smith, 343 Pa. 446, 450, 23 A.2d 440, 442 (1940).
39. 1 COOLEY, supra note 22.
40. Id. at 170.
41. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
42. Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environ-
mental Rights, Analysis of HB 958, 41 PA. BAQ 427 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as BROUGHTON].
43. PA. CoNST. art. I, § 27.
44. O'Connor v. Armstrong, 299 Pa. 390, 396, 149 A. 655, 658 (1930)
(wherein the court held that a provision "inextricably tied up with the
rest" could not be self-executing).
45. Miller v. Robertson, 306 Ky. 653, 659-60, 208 S.W.2d 977, 980-81
(1948). In Miller, the court was interpreting a constitutional provision
which provided:
The salaries of public officers shall not be changed ... but it
shall be the duty of the General Assembly to regulate . . . what
deductions shall be made for neglect of official duties.
The court stated: "[T]he section has been . . . regarded as containing
two distinctive mandates .... [T]he first part . . . is [self-executing],
but the second part requires legislative action to put it into effect." Id.
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ment could be given legal effect in at least four different areas:46
(1) The people have reserved environmental rights for them-
selves which cannot be abridged by governmental actions.
(2) The people have reserved environmental rights which
cannot be abridged by the actions of other private persons.
(3) The Commonwealth has a duty to protect and conserve
the public natural resources owned by the State.
(4) The Commonwealth has a duty to protect and conserve
public natural resources, including the values enumerated in the
first sentence, against abridgement by private acts whenever such
acts threaten those resources. (This was the situation in the Get-
tysburg tower case).
The legal effect of (1) and (2) is dependent upon whether the af-
firmative right to environmental quality is self-executing whereas
the legal effect of (3) and (4) is dependent upon whether the sec-
ond provision of the amendment is found to have imposed a duty
on the Commonwealth to act as trustee of the public natural re-
sources. If one or both of the provisions are found to be self-exe-
cuting, it would seem that the amendment could be further con-
strued to have been intended to apply only to state action, in
which case (1) and (3) would be legally effective but (2) and (4)
would not.
Several objections have been raised as to why the amendment
is not self-executing. First, it is claimed that the "provision as
written is unquestionably a declaration of principle and policy.
. . .,47 Next, it is argued that the terms used are too vague or too
technical for judicial interpretation. 4 Further, the duty to act as
the people's trustee is given to the Commonwealth; therefore, the
executive department cannot, in a tripartate system of government,
arbitrarily assume the power to act for the other co-equal
branches. 49 Moreover, it "raises . . . serious questions under both
the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the United
States Constitution."" o Finally, it has been stated that the amend-
ment expands the power of the Commonwealth to act against the
46. See BROUGHTON, supra note 42, at 427.
47. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 231, 250, 302 A.2d 886, 895 (1973) (concurring and
dissenting opinion) (quoting from Commonwealth v. United States Steel
Corp., No. 1550, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County (April 1972) ).
48. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 200, 311 A.2d 588, 593 (1973).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 203, 311 A.2d at 593-94.
citizens, and no such provision has ever been held to be self-exe-
cuting. 51 Of these, only the first two are general objections which
would tend to defeat the amendment in its entirety.
Based on the principles of construction above,52 it does not
seem that the amendment was intended to be solely a declaration
of principle and policy. The language is not at all like that of
other constitutional provisions which have been held to be dec-
larations of this type. The latter type almost invariably speak in
terms of "The policy of this State shall be . . . . ",3 "The legisla-
ture is hereby authorized," 54 "[T]he General Assembly may,"55 or
even "[T] he General Assembly shall. '5 6 Furthermore, provisions
of this nature generally involve criteria for the incorporation of
cities or establishing courts;57 procedures for conducting elections
or filling vacancies; 8 principles for uniform taxation; 59 authority
for legislative action in previously unconstitutional areas;60 or
other similar procedures."'
In sharp contrast to the above, the Environmental Rights
Amendment states that "[t] he people have a right. . ."I and that
"the Commonwealth shall conserve ... ."61 There is no language
contained within the amendment which either expressly or by
clear implication suggest that it was intended to be a statement of
principle or policy only. 64  Rather it would seem, using the or-
51. Id. at 201, 311 A.2d at 592.
52. See notes 18-40 and accompanying text supra.
53. See note 64 infra.
54. E.g., O'Connor v. Armstrong, 299 Pa. 390, 395, 149 A. 655, 657
(1930).
55. E.g., Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 183,
301 A.2d 849, 851 (1973); Robert Morris College v. Board of Property
Assessment, Appeals & Review, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 648, 654, 291 A.2d
569, 571 (1972).
56. Commonwealth v. Harding, 87 Pa. 343, 351 (1878).
57. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bricker, 406 Pa. 422, 425, 178 A.2d 699,
700 (1962); Commonwealth v. Harding, 87 Pa. 343, 351 (1878).
58. Eagen v. Smith, 366 Pa. 501, 504, 78 A.2d 801, 802 (1951); O'Neill
v. White, 343 Pa. 96, 98, 22 A.2d 25, 26 (1941).
59. E.g., Coatsville Gas Co. v. County of Chester, 97 Pa. 476, 481
(1881); Robert Morris College v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals
& Review, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 648, 654, 291 A.2d 569, 571 (1972).
60. E.g., Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 183, 301
A.2d 849, 851 (1973); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 80 Pa. 57, 58 (1875);
Brunke v. Ridley Township, 154 Pa. Super. 182, 183-84, 35 A.2d 751, 752
(1944).
61. Bradford County Telephone Co. v. Young, 329 Pa. 433, 436, 198
A. 96, 97 (1938) (corporate sale of stocks or bonds); Yetter v. Delaware
Valley R. Co., 206 Pa. 485, 488, 56 A. 57, 58 (1903); Lewis v. Lackawanna
County, 200 Pa. 590, 594, 50 A. 162, 163 (1901).
62. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
63. Id.
64. New York, Michigan and Massachusetts have ratified similar
amendments which are clearly policy statements only. MICH. CONST. art.
IV, § 52:
The conservation and development of the national resources
of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern
in the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the
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dinary meaning of the words,6 5 that the amendment was intended
to create rights and impose duties.66 Similar constitutional pro-
visions, not lacking a sufficient rule for implementation, have con-
sistently been held self-executing.6 7 Therefore, it would seem that
the amendment should not be dismissed as a mere policy state-
ment. As stated by Justice Jones, "If the amendment was intended
only to espouse a policy undisposed to enforcement without sup-
plementing legislation, it would surely have taken a different
form."
68
people. The legislature shall provide for the protection of the
air, water and other natural resources of the state from pollution,
impairment and destruction.
MAss. CoNsT. art. XLIX:
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom
from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, his-
toric, and esthetic qualities of their environment; and the protec-
tion of the people in their right to the conservation, development
and utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and
other natural resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose.
The general court shall have the power to enact legislation
necessary or expedient to protect such rights.
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court
shall have the power to provide for the taking, upon payment of
just compensation therefor, or for the acquisition by purchase or
otherwise, of lands and easements or such other interests therein
as may be deemed necessary to accomplish these purposes.
Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes shall
not be used for other purposes or otherwise disposed of except by
laws enacted by a two-thirds vote, taken by yeas and nays, of each
branch of the general court.
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4:
The policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty and encourage the develop-
ment and improvement of its agricultural lands for the production
of food and other agricultural products. The legislature, in imple-
menting this policy, shall include adequate provision for the abate-
ment of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary
noise, the protection of agricultural lands, wetlands, and shore-
lines, and the development and regulation of water resources.
The legislature shall further provide for the acquisition of lands
and waters. . . . [emphasis added.]
65. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
66. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 208, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
67. E.g., Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 363; 93 A.2d 834, 838 (1953)
("All offices are hereby abolished . . ."); Commonwealth v. Smith, 343
Pa. 446, 448, 23 A.2d 440, 442 (1942) ("no member . . . shall. ... ); Clark
v. City of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 521, 529, 196 A. 384, 387 (1938); Common-
wealth v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 347-48, 161 A. 323, 324 (1932); Erdman v.
Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 91, 56 A. 327, 331 (1903) (right to acquire property;
also stating all rights are independent of legislation); Pierce v. Common-
wealth, 104 Pa. 150, 154 (1883); Commonwealth v. Knox, 172 Pa. Super.
510, 524, 94 A.2d 128, 134 (1953), aff'd, 374 Pa. 343, 97 A.2d 782 (1953)
("All officers shall be removed .... Their ... self-executing mandate
must be complied with ... "'). See Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super.
182, 182, 303 A.2d 843, 844 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
68. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 208, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
If it is agreed that the amendment was intended to be legally
effective, then if either of the distinct provisions therein must fail
to fulfill that intent, it should fail only for want of a "sufficient
rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed ... or
the duty imposed may be enforced . ,,69 The amendment would
clearly lack such a sufficient rule if the terms used were too vague
or technical for judicial interpretation. In support of this argu-
ment it has been asked, "[W]hat is clean air?" 70  Does it mean
"air containing only the elements and compounds set forth [in the
scientific definition] plus water vapor which also has to be pure[?].
. . . Is it something better than exists in our present environ-
ment or something other than the foregoing mixture?" 71 Similar
questions have been asked in regard to the other terms.7 2 Yet, if
the words are construed in their natural, popular sense, according
to a standard of reasonableness, with the object of finding the in-
tent of the ratifiers,7 3 it is submitted that reasonable answers ca-
pable of judicial analysis can be found. This is especially so when
it is realized that each and every term employed has long been the
subject of judicial interpretation.
7 4
"Clean air" and "pure water," used in the sense understood
by laymen, seemingly should mean no more than air and water
which is not polluted, as that term is popularly understood. That
such terms may also have technical meanings, and are susceptible
of standardization by scientifically measured criteria,7 5 should not
render them incapable of judicial interpretation any more than is
the word "drunkenness" so rendered by modern scientific tests for
measuring that condition.T6 In fact, in the field of nuisance, courts
have long passed on these terms.
77
69. 1 COOLEY, supra note 22, at 167-68. See notes 25-26 and accom-
panying text supra.
70. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,




73. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 75-99 and accompanying text infra.
75. Such criteria have been incorporated into the Air Pollution Con-
trol Act (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4004 (Supp. 1973) ) and the Clean
Streams Act (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691 (Supp. 1973) ).
76. E.g., McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 421, 235 S.W.2d 173, 175
(1950). Even if legislative standards were established they could not be
regarded as absolutes. For example, if damaging air pollution was within
the legislative standards the Court would still have the duty and power to
grant relief based on Article I, Section 27 or on property rights. See
Commonwealth v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., 367 Pa. 40, 53, 79 A.2d
439, 446 (1951); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 91, 56 A. 327, 330-31 (1903).
77. Air Pollution: e.g., Kent v. General Chemical Co., 285 Pa. 34, 36,
131 A. 588, 589-90 (1925); Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa.
540, 543-45, 555, 57 A. 1065, 1066-67, 1071 (1904); Evans v. Reading Chemi-
cal & Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 211-12, 28 A. 702, 702-03 (1894). Water
Pollution: e.g., Commonwealth v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., 367 Pa.
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In 1880, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 78 upheld an injunc-
tion prohibiting operation of a lead smelting plant where it:
emit(ted) noxious and poisonous gases, fumes and vapors
. . . [which fell] upon the plaintiff's land, thereby poison-
ing and destroying both soil and vegetation; that cattle
* . .died . . . [and] that these fumes were offensive and
noxious to persons resident upon said farm .... 79
The court further stated that "[iJn this matter we need no chem-
ists and experts to teach us for common experience is sufficient." 81'
Similarly, in 1913, the Court of Appeals of New York"' en-
joined operation of a pulp mill where it
discharge[d] into the waters of the creek large quantities
of a liquid effluent containing sulpherous acid, lime, sul-
phur, and waste material consisting of pulp wood, saw-
dust, slivers, knots, gums, resins, and fiber.
8 2
It is submitted that "clean air" and "pure water" should be at
least equally subject to judicial interpretation today, when pollu-
tion is considered to be a serious social problem, as it was at the
turn of the century when pollution was not so regarded.
Natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values have often been
construed by the courts in giving effect to statutory enactments.8 3
The Project 70 Land Acquisition Act 8 4 authorizes various De-
partments of the Commonwealth to acquire lands, by condemna-
tion or otherwise, "for recreation, conservation and historical pur-
poses." 85 Even though condemnation proceedings are to be strictly
construed,88 such actions have been upheld under this statute1
7
Historic, scenic and aesthetic effects have often been adjudi-
cated in determining the validity of zoning ordinances. 8 Although
40, 47-48, 79 A.2d 439, 442 (1951); Haughs' Appeal, 102 Pa. 42, 44 (1883);
McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa. 40, 60 (1867).
78. Appeal of the Pennsylvania Lead Company, 96 Pa. 116 (1880).
79. Id. at 125.
80. Id. See Kent v. General Chemical Co., 285 Pa. 34, 36-37, 131 A.
588, 589 (1925); Johnson v. Valvoline Oil Co., 131 Pa. Super. 266, 274, 200
A. 224, 229 (1938).
81. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
82. Id. at 3, 101 N.E. at 805.
83. See notes 84-98 and accompanying text infra.
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3946 (1968).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3946.17 (1968).
86. Avery v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 105, 108-09,
276 A.2d 843, 845 (1973).
87. Id; Kahn v. Pennsylvania Fish Commission, 19 Cumb. L.J. 52
(Pa. C.P. 1967).
88. E.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 780-82,
128 N.E.2d 557, 561-62 (1955); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393
Pa. 106, 117, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (1958); Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of
originally such factors could only be secondary considerations,89
more recently they frequently provide the primary 0 or sole 9' ba-
sis for upholding them.
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive
[citations omitted]. The values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled.
9 2
It would seem that no greater problems are involved in interpre-
ting such terms in the context of the Environmental Rights
Amendment than are encountered in the area of zoning. 93
Under the National Environmental Protection Act,94 courts
and administrative bodies often have been required to interpret
very similar language.95 The Federal Courts, in ruling on the suf-
ficiency of the environmental impact statements required under
the Ant 96 have frequent1y dealt with natural, scenic and aesthetic
factors.9 7 Similar factors have been adjudicated by the Federal
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 73, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958); Cox v. Township of
New Sewickley, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 28, 35, 284 A.2d 829, 832 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauph. Co. 91 (Pa. C.P. 1942).
89. Kerr's Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 250, 144 A. 81, 83 (1928).
90. E.g., Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62,
73, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958) ("[W]ith the passage of time . . . aesthetic
considerations have progressively become more and more persuasive as
sustaining reasons for the exercise of the police power." Id.); Best v.
zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 393 Pa. 106, 116-18,
141 A.2d 606, 610-13 (1958); Cox v. Township of New Sewickley, 4 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 28, 35, 284 A.2d 829, 832 (1971).
91. Cox v. Township of New Sewickley, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 28,
37, 284 A.2d 829, 833 (1971); Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauph. Co. 91
(Pa. C.P. 1942). Contra see, e.g., Grish Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 263 A.2d
395, 398 (1970), noted in 74 DiCK L. REv. 634 (1970).
92. Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 73,
141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958), quoting from Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954).
93. Although the courts would accept the legislative judgment unless
it was determined that the ordinance or statute was "arbitrary, capricious,
discriminatory, or confiscatory. .. ." (Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board
of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 72, 141 A.2d 851, 856 (1958) ), in the final analy-
sis the court would have to determine whether the fact situation generally
promoted the "general welfare" when interpreted to include aesthetic,
scenic and historic considerations. The burden of proof would be much
different but the basic problem would appear to be the same. See cases
cited note 88 supra.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) (language speaks in terms of "estheti-
cally and culturally pleasing surroundings . . ." and the preservation of
"important historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national heritage.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
97. E.g., Jicarilla Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir.
1973); Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d
Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the
U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
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Courts in other environmental areas.98
Considering the vast body of law which has already construed
the terms, there would seem to be no logically valid argument,
as to why Article I, Section 27 could not also be given similar effect.
As Judge Rogers stated:
[T] he standard of Section 27 seems to us not to require
legislative definition, however desirable such might be.
Courts, which have attacked with gusto such indistinct
concepts as due process, equal protection, unreasonable
search and seizure, and cruel and unusual punishment, will
surely not hesitate before such comparatively certain meas-
ures as clean air, pure water and natural, scenic, historic
and aesthetic values.99
If it is accepted, as would appear reasonable, that the terms
are neither too vague nor technical for judicial interpretation and
that the amendment was not intended merely as a policy state-
ment, then, since the remaining objections concern the second pro-
vision of the amendment, the first provision at least should be self-
executing. Even though the opinion of the court in Gettysburg
held that the amendment was not self-executing, the opinion states
that "the first part of § 27, if read alone, could be read to be self-
executing."100 Furthermore, the more specific objections to be dis-
cussed below seem to concern only actions by the State, as trustee,
against private citizens. Therefore, it is submitted that the second
provision should be held to have imposed the public trust doctrine
at least on the State's management and use of its own resources,
even if valid reasons are found for not construing it to affect pri-
vate actions.1 1
In regard to the assertion of the public trust against private
citizens, it has been stated that, since the amendment gives the
power of trustee to the Commonwealth, the executive branch of
government cannot assert that power without specific legislative
authority. 0 2 However, the government has historically been re-
garded as possessing not only the power but also the duty to assert
98. Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965). Both of the above cases contested authorization by the
Federal Power Commission of the construction of hydroelectric dams in
wilderness areas.
99. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 231, 243-44, 302 A.2d 886, 892 (1973). ..
100. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield, Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 200, 311 A.2d 588, 592 (1973).
101. See notes 233-59 and accompanying text infra.
102. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 202, 311 A.2d 588, 593 (1973).
the public trust'03 and, in such cases, the Attorney General, 'acting
as parens patriae, has been considered the proper officer to assert
that trust. 0 4 It would seem that there is no compelling reason to
depart from the precedent established by such cases when imple-
menting the public trust imposed by the Environmental Rights
Amendment. As stated by Judge MacPhail:
It seems to us that there is no other, or at least no better,
officer to enforce the provisions of the amendment than
the Attorney General. It is true this ruling casts a heavy
burden upon [him] to determine what does and what does
not injure the natural resources of the Commonwealth,
but the officer must make similar judgments in other areas
of the law with equally far reaching effects. 10 5
Furthermore, recognizing the Attorney General's authority to
file suit as trustee does not seem to be an unwarranted usurpation
of power by the Executive in a tripartite system of government.
The legislature may yet enact statutes defining how those duties
are to be exercised so as to more effectively enforce the provisions
of the amendment.1 6 Also, the judiciary may exercise its tradi-
tional power of review of statutes so enacted to determine whether
they enhance the public trust, or, on the other hand, are uncon-
stitutional.107 Furthermore, although the Attorney General may
initiate the suit, the final determination of the merits of the action
is by the judiciary.'0 8 Viewed in this manner, the co-equal tri-
partite system of government operates together, one checking the
others, thereby tending to insure the protection of the public trust.
The exercise of the public trust by the Commonwealth in ac-
tions against individuals would involve both discretion on the part
of the acting officer and restraints on the permissible uses of land.
Yet this would not appear to constitute a violation of either due
process or equal protection when asserted to protect the public nat-
ural resources. 0 9
103. See cases cited note 104 infra.
104. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (Public trust
in navigable waters); Commonwealth v. The Barnes Foundation, 398 Pa.
458, 467, 159 A.2d 500, 503 (1960) (Charitable public trusts); Commonwealth
v. Rush, 14 Pa. 186, 187 (1850) (Public trust created by grantor); State v.
Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 113, 81 N.W.2d 71, 72 (1957) (Public
trust in navigable waters).
105. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
13 Adams L.J. 75, 80 (Pa. C.P. 1971). See Commonwealth v. National
Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 206, 311 A.2d 588, 594 (1973)
(concurring opinion states that the Attorney General, even before passage
of the Environmental Rights Amendment, had such a power to sue).
106. E.g., Direct Sellers Ass'n. of Arizona v. McBrayer, 16 Ariz. App.
231, 234, 492 P.2d 727, 730 (1972).
107. See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Klauber
v. Higgins, 117 Cal. 451, 464 (1897); Baker v. Bosworth, 122 Colo. 356, 363,
222 P.2d 416, 419 (1950); Berberian v. Board of Canvassers, 91 R.I. 49, 50,
161 A.2d 416, 420 (1960).
108. E.g., Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
109. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 22 F.2d 993, 995 (3d Cir. 1927).
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Due process is not denied by a legislative enactment so long
as it bears "a substantial relation to the public interests." 110  So
long as the complainant has the right to be heard in courts, the
requirements of due process in that respect are satisfied."1  How-
ever, if the effect of the inhibition on land use is sufficient to con-
stitute a taking, then, by due process, just compensation is re-
quired." 2 Yet very severe restrictions may be placed on the use
of land before it constitutes such a taking, so long as they are in
the public interest.11 3 Land ownership has never been absolute,
and one's use of his land is subject to reasonable regulation by the
state." 4 Exactly where the line is to be drawn between "reason-
able regulation" as opposed to "confiscation" will always pose a
problem for the courts. But as has been recognized:
It may eventually be necessary to confront the question
whether certain restrictions, imposed either by courts or
by other governmental agencies, constitute a taking of
private property; but a great deal of needed protection for
the public can be provided long before that question is
reached. .... 1.15
Furthermore, the action would not seem violative of equal
protection rights. The law, part of the Constitution, applies in the
first instance to every citizen of the state equally. So long as
there was no intentional or purposeful discrimination, or arbitrary
application, there would be no violation of the federal constitu-
tional constraints."
16
However, if the actions by the Attorney General were not
based on the public trust as a property concept, but rather based
upon the police power of the state, the actions would likely violate
due process and equal protection requirements."' The action in
110. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Comm'n, 309 U.S. 30, 32 (1940).
111. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 206, 311 A.2d 588, 595 (concurring opinion).
112. Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 193, 82 A.2d 34, 36
(1951).
113. Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 72-73,
141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 196,
82 A.2d 34, 38 (1951); Just v. Marinette Co., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d
761, 767 (1972); Gaebel v. Thornbury Twp., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 399,
402, 303 A.2d 57, 59 (1973); Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 441, 451-52, 279 A.2d 388, 394 (1971).
114. See notes 272-74 and accompanying text infra.
115. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law; Effec-
tive Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 473, 557 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as SAX].
116. State v. Berberian, 109 R.I. 309, 316, 284 A.2d 590, 594 (1971).
117. See notes 248-59 and accompanying text infra.
such cases would not be based on protecting public property inter-
ests but rather would be based on personal values."" This would
amount to spot zoning and be prohibited.119 As was stated in a re-
cent case:
. . . an ordinance cannot create an "island" of more or less
restricted use within a district zoned for a different use or
uses, where there are no differentiating relevant factors
between the "island" and the district. A singling out of
one lot or a small area for different treatment from that
accorded to similar surrounding land indistinguishable
from it in character, for the economic benefit of the owner
of that lot or to his economic detriment, is invalid as "spot"
zoning.
2 0
It would seem that each successful lawsuit brought, by the Attor-
ney General, if based on the police power rather than on the pro-
tection of public property, would in effect create such an "island."
So long as the Commonwealth's exercise of its powers under
the amendment is within the requirements concerning due proc-
ess and equal protection,'1 2 there would seem to be little reason for
objection to Section 27 solely because it expands the power of gov-
ernment to act against its citizens.' 22 The intent of the ratifiers
would appear to impose this duty to act upon the Commonwealth
for the benefit of all the people to protect the public trust.123  If
this is the intent of the people, 124 and if the object of the analysis
is to give effect to that intent 125 as found, and if no other reason
is found for frustrating that intent, then it should not fail in its
purpose merely because it is original. 26
For the reasons presented above, it is submitted that the En-
vironmental Rights Amendment should be considered self-execut-
ing even to the extent of allowing the Attorney General to sue
private citizens, provided such suits allege an injury to public nat-
ural resources. It would seem that this position was supported
by a majority of the Supreme Court in the Gettysburg case, since
the dissenting opinion stated the amendment was self-executingl 27
and the concurring opinion stated it could find no error in the
118. Id.
119. See Clawson v. Harborcreek Zoning Hearing Board, 9 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 124, 128-29, 304 A.2d 184, 186-87 (1973).
120. Id.
121. See notes 109-20 and accompanying text supra.
122. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 206, 311 A.2d 588, 595 (1973) (concurring opinion).
123. PA. CoxST. art. I, § 27.
124. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
125. American Youth Foundation v. Township of Benona, 8 Mich. App.
521, 528, 154 N.W.2d 554, 558 (1967).
126. Compare the Opinion of the Court with the concurring and dis-
senting opinions in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
127. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 208, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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lower court opinions, which held the same.128 The remainder of
this Comment will examine some of the implications of this posi-
tion.
II. THE FIRST PROVISION ON CITIZENS' ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS AS A LImIrr ON GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS
If the Environmental Rights Amendment was construed to
have accomplished no more than to create rights in the people
which could not be abridged by the government,129 in a manner
similar to the Bill of Rights,1 30 then it would nonetheless have a
significant effect on governmental actions.
It would seem that if the legislature enacted a statute which
interfered with these rights,1 1 then by familiar principles of judi-
cial review, the statute, unless otherwise supportable, would be
unconstitutional and void.13 2 Arguably, at least, a statute which
authorized governmental actions having an environmental impact
without requiring reasonable controls to prevent air and water
pollution, and especially if the statute waived a regulation which
would otherwise have required them,' 33 would present a strong
case for unconstitutionality. The same should be true of a statute
which authorized the degradation of natural, scenic, aesthetic or
historic areas where no other reasonable public purpose was
served.
3 4
128. Id. at 595 (concurring opinion). See Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 14, 28, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (1973) (wherein the majority of
the court held the Environmental Rights Amendment to be self-executing,
stating that the Supreme Court decision in Gettysburg was not decisive on
the issue).
129. To so find requires only that: (1) the terms are not too vague or
technical for judicial interpretation (see notes 69-99 and accompanying
text supra); and (2) the amendment was not intended to be merely a
policy statement (see notes 53-68 and accompanying text supra).
130. It is noteworthy in this respect that the language used in PA.
CoNsT. art. I, § 27 is parallel with that in PA. CONST. art. I, § 20: "The
citizens have a right ... to assemble together for their common good ..
Id. See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
131. Statutes of this nature could take many forms. Since the amend-
ment is, by and large, original no specific cases are available.
132. E.g., Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 44,
58 A.2d 464, 469 (1948).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964) sets standards for air
pollution. Yet actions by the government seem to be excepted from com-
plying with the standards: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4009 (1964).
134. Under the Project 70 Land Acquisition Act (PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
72, § 3946 (1968) ) lands may be acquired by the state for recreational and
historical purposes (see notes 84-87 and accompanying text supra). The
legislature by statute (Oct. 1967, July 25, P.L. 183 as amended--see PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3946.20 (Supp. 1973) ) authorized the industrial develop-
However, suppose such a questionable statute was enacted,
and then challenged as a violation of Article I, Section 27. The
complainant would be confronted with a difficult burden of proof:
[W] e can declare an Act of Assembly void, only when it
violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, plainly; and in
such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation on our
minds [citations omitted].135
Although legislative enactments may profoundly affect the en-
vironment, the overall impact of the day-to-day rulings of the
various administrative agencies would appear far greater.1 6 The
Public Utilities Commission, for example, issues "certificates of
public convenience"'137 to utilities which authorize them to con-
demn lands for site and right of way acquisition. 18 The Depart-
ment of Highways plans the locations of roads and the like and
also has the power to condemn lands for those purposes.1 39  The
Department of Environmental Resources 140 has broad discretionary
power to grant or withhold licenses or to fine and suspend indus-
trial operations.1 4 ' These agencies are required to exercise th..eir
powers in the public interest.
42
The courts have recognized that the public interest may be
subordinated to that of other political pressure groups. 43  But in
reviewing such decisions the scope of judicial review is limited by
statute:
44
The court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall find
that the same is in violation of the constitutional rights
of the appellant, or is not in accordance with the law ...
or that any finding of fact made by the agency and neces-
ment of a portion of a tract of land so acquired. If one could show that no
public interest was served (see notes 154-232 and accompanying text infra
regarding the public trust doctrine), an act of this nature would appear
unconstitutional.
135. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 113, 141 A.2d 606,
610 (1958).
136. Comment, Eminent Domain and the Environment, 58 CORNEIL
L. REv. 651 (1971).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1121-23 (1959).
138. E.g., Lower Chichester Township v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commn, 181 Pa. Super. 503, 509, 119 A.2d 674, 678 (1956).
139. See In Re: Condemnation by Dept. of Highways in East Penns-
boro Township, 17 Cumb. L.J. 192 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510 (Supp. 1973).
141. See Sierra Club v. Sanitary Water Bd., 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
110, 281 A.2d 256 (1971).
142. Redevelopment Auth. v. Owners, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 378, 383,
274 A.2d 244, 247 (1971); Citizens Water Co. of Washington, Pa. v. Penn-
sylvania Public Utility Commission, 181 Pa. Super. 301, 307, 124 A.2d 123,
126 (1956).
143. Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 422 Pa. 317, 329, 221 A.2d 138,
145 (1966): "The mushrooming of authorities at all levels of government
and the frequent complaint that such bodies act in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner in violation of existing law dictate that a check rein be kept
upon them [citations omitted]." Id.; Redevelopment Auth. v. Owner, 1
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 378, 383, 274 A.2d 244, 247 (1971).
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962).
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sary to support its adjudication is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
145
When relevant factors have not been considered, the court may
reverse, or remand the case and order the commission to make
another finding, with the omitted factor in view.146 If the peo-
ple have a right to the preservation of the values enumerated in
Article I, Section 27, then a failure to consider those factors, when
the administrative decision affects the environment, would seem
to be the type of error reviewable by the courts.
147
If the record of the commission revealed a total failure to con-
sider the environment, the review would be relatively easy. How-
ever if the record showed the facts were brought to the attention
of the commission, then reversal based on the traditional scope of
review would be difficult. The agency decision will not be va-
cated "in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse
of power .... [J] udicial discretion will not be substituted for ad-
ministrative discretion.'
1 48
However, to this general rule, there would appear to be one
exception. When constitutional rights are involved there is au-
thority that the courts have a duty to then review the record on
the merits. 149 This same principle should apply to other alleged
violations of constitutional rights under Article I, Section 27.150 On
145. Id.
146. See Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 441, 461, 279 A.2d 388, 399 (1971).
147. Flowers v. Northampton Bucks County Municipal Auth., 57 Pa.
D. & C.2d 274, 279 (Bucks Co. 1972). This appears to be the only case to
consider this exact issue. The Chancellor stated:
It is axiomatic that in order to avoid capricious action, a public
body must give proper consideration to all relevant factors. That
environmental considerations have become relevant factors is
demonstrated by the adoption of Article I, sec. 27, of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution.
Id.
148. Blumenschein v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 379 Pa. 566, 572-73,
109 A.2d 331, 334-35 (1954), quoted with approval in Sierra Club v. Sani-
tary Water Bd., 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 110, 115, 281 A.2d 256, 258-59
(1971).
149. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287,
291 (1919); De Vito v. Civil Service Comm'n, 404 Pa. 354, 359, 172 A.2d 161,
163 (1961); Staton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.,
543, 544-45, 275 A.2d 716, 717 (1971). In the latter case the court stated:
The exceptions to the general rule that only jurisdiction and the
regularity of the proceedings are subject to judicial scrutiny are
... second, where individual rights or property rights ordained or
guaranteed by the Federal or State Constitution have been vio-
lated by the administrative agency or the lower court [citations
.omitted].
Id.
150. See note 147 supra.
this basis the court could broaden the scope of review without
breaking precedent,' 5 ' and this in turn would present the environ-
mentalists with a substantially easier burden of proof.' 52 Rather
than showing the action was arbitrary or capricious, the complain-
ant would only have to show that the conclusion is not supported
by the facts.
1 3
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A LIMIT ON
GOVERNMENTAL USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
Historically, the public trust concept involved public rights
in waterways and shorelines, primarily for the commercial pur-
poses of fishing and navigation.154 It was felt that whatever title
any governmental unit or private individual claimed to have in
such property was subject to these public rights. 5 5 Any other
use of the property could not interfere with those rights, and in-
consistent uses could be legally restrained.'5 6 An attempt by a
governmenital unit to convey fcc si.ple tit.le In such propcr-W to
private grantees was ineffective and could either be voided' 5 7 or
the private title recognized but subject to the same public trust. 58
In the 1892 case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois,15 9 the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The public being interested in the use of such waters,
the possession by private individuals of lands under them
could not be permitted except by license of the crown,
which could alone exercise such dominion over the waters
as would insure freedom in their use so far as consistent
with the public interest. This doctrine is founded upon
the necessity of preserving to the public the use of nav-
igable waters from private interruption and encroach-
ment.' "0
More recently some jurisdictions have expanded the public
trust doctrine by recognizing a broader range of public interests
151. See cases cited note 149 supra.
152. Id.
153. Under this principle the complainant is entitled to have one judi-
cial tribunal examine and weigh the facts. See cases cited note 149 supra.
154. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 390 (1892); SAX, supra
note 115, at 475-78.
155. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 390 (1892).
156. E.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892);
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 419, 215 N.E.2d
114, 121 (1966).
157. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892):
The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmen-
tal, and cannot be alienated, except for parcels used in the im-
provement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be dis-
posed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining.
158. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cushing 53, 74-75, 61 Mass. 53, 74-75
(1851) (cited in SAx, supra note 115 at 487).
159. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
160. Id. at 390.
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in lakes and rivers' 61 and by including other governmentally owned
property within the concept. 162 Massachusetts, for example, has
applied the doctrine to municipal'6 3 and state parks. 6 4 Wisconsin
now recognizes that the public interest in lakes and rivers includes
"pleasure boating, sailing, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, and
enjoyment of scenic beauty."'16 5
Yet, even under the modern concept of the public trust it re-
mains a property concept.16 6 There must be a trust res consisting
of some legally cognizable public right in property before the
public trust doctrine seems applicable.
67
In navigable waters and shorelines this right is considered to
have been reserved by the sovereign in any conveyance of land
along waterways, or, in the alternative, to have been incapable of
conveyance, with any such attempt being void. 68 Other govern-
mentally owned lands may have been dedicated to public use by
the grantor,169 by legislative enactments 7 0 or by public use. 171 In
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,1 72 Justice Holmes, in granting an
injunction enjoining a mining company in a bordering state from
polluting the air over Georgia, held that the state, in its capacity
as quasi-sovereign, "has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain."'
73
161. E.g., State v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 117, 81 N.W.2d
71, 74 (1957).162. E.g., Paepcke v. Public Building Comm'n, 46 11.2d 330, 336, 263
N.E.2d 11, 15 (1970); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass.
410, 419, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (1966).
163. E.g., Town of Brookline v. Metropolitan District Comm'n, 357
Mass. 435, 436, 258 N.E.2d 284, 285 (1970).
164. E.g., Abbot v. Comm'rs, 357 Mass. 784, 785, 260 N.E.2d 142, 143
(1970).
165. State v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 118, 81 N.W.2d 71,
74 (1957).
166. See cases cited notes 154-65 supra. No case was found which ex-
plicitly limited the doctrine to property (versus personal or non-property)
rights. Yet each case deals with a property concept. See BROUGHTON, supra
note 42, at 425.
167. A basic rule of trusts is that there must be a trust res-some
property forming the subject matter of the trust. This is not explicitly
stated in any of the cases examined by the writer concerning the public
trust doctrine. The reason would seem to be that this condition is pre-
sumed and therefore not discussed.
168. See notes 154-60 and accompanying text supra.
169. E.g., Shields v. Philadelphia, 405 Pa. 600, 602, 176 A.2d 697, 698
(1962).
170. E.g., Goodman Appeal, 425 Pa. 23, 25, 227 A.2d 816, 818 (1967).
171. Bruker v. Carlisle Borough, 376 Pa. 330, 336, 102 A.2d 418, 421
(1954).
172. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
173. Id. at 237.
In Pennsylvania the trust res under the Environmental Rights
Amendment consists of "Pennsylvania's public natural re-
sources."' 74 The doctrine should embrace at least all governmen-
tally owned lands 17 5 and minerals plus those types of property not
subject to absolute private appropriation: air, water, fish, wild-
life, and navigable waters.7 6 Insofar as it is a property concept
the trust res would include the values enumerated in the first
sentence of the amendment only if those values are considered to
be within the domain of the public property. 77 The dissenting
opinion in Gettysburg recognized such a property right: "The 'nat-
ural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment' are
the trust res.' 178 The concurring opinion seemed to represent a
similar view.'7 9 Since these two opinions represent a majority of
the court, there would appear to be a strong possibility that such
an interpretation of the amendment will prevail.
1 80
By common law principles the trustee of this property is the
government.' 8' As trustee, the government must act in further-
ance of the interests of the trust beneficiaries-the public. 8 2  The
last sentence of Article I, Section 27 imposes similar duties on the
Commonwealth. 8 3
However, the concept of the public trust doctrine is not with-
out problems for the courts. On the one hand, the courts presume
that in a democratic society the executive department, the legisla-
ture and its administrative agencies act at all times in the public
interest. 8 4  On the other, the realities demonstrate that often im-
portant segments of that interest fail to receive proper considera-
tion, and that small but powerful vested interests at direct odds
174. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
175. Land owned by a governmental unit in its proprietory capacity
may not be properly included. See, e.g., Baily v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa.
594, 602, 605-06, 39 A. 494, 495, 497 (1898); Warren v. Bradley, 39 Tenn.
App. 451, 459, 284 S.W.2d 698, 702 (1955).
176. See BROUGHTON, supra note 42, at 426. The original draft of the
amendment read "Pennsylvania's natural resources, including the air, wa-
ters, fish, wildlife, and the public lands and property of the Commonwealth.
." Id. at 421.
177. BROUGHTON, sup 'a note 42, at 425.
178. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 208, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
179. Id. at 206, 311 A.2d at 595 (concurring opinion).
180. Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Manderino, wrote the concurring
opinion and Justice Jones, joined by Justice Eagen, wrote the dissenting
opinion. See notes 178-79 and accompanying text supra.
181. E.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
182. Id.
183. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 27. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
184. Goodman Appeal, 425 Pa. 23, 30, 227 A.2d 816, 823 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 101, 306 A.2d 308, 321 (1973)
("We are supported in our view by the statutory presumption 'that the
legislature intends to favor the public interest as against any private inter-




with that of the public may often dictate the decisions. 185 The
courts are not blind to the results but they are confronted with a
dilemma. To grant relief in the latter case is to assert that the
democratic process is not working; to deny relief is to allow the
public interest to be subverted.
18 6
Yet another problem arises if the courts are asked to accept
the argument of more zealous environmental advocates that public
lands presently committed to one use are irrevocably committed,
and that it is therefore beyond the legitimate power of govern-
ment to ever alter that use.8 7 As stated by Professor Sax:
However strongly one might feel about the present im-
balance in resource allocation, it hardly seems sensible to
ask for a freezing of any future specific configuration of
policy judgments, for that result would seriously hamper
the governments' attempts to cope with the problems caused
by changes in the needs and desires of the citizenry. 88
The courts should be very hesitant to execute the public trust on
such a restrictive basis.'8 9
It has been suggested that the present public interest is not
necessarily best served by the past uses of land, that such uses at
times must change to accommodate the interests of an increasing
population,1 0 and that the public interest is wide-ranged and di-
versified and seldom served by a decision based on narrow vested
interests.' 9' The key to the solution would seem to be a policy
185. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 421, 215
N.E.2d 114, 123 (1966); Goodman Appeal, 425 Pa. 23, 31, 227 A.2d 816, 822
(1967); Redevelopment Auth. v. Owners, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 378,
383, 274 A.2d 244, 247 (1971).
186. See SAX, supra note 115, at 495-96.
187. See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 421,
215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (1966); Bernstein v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 200, 204, 77
A.2d 452, 454 (1951); SAX, supra note 115, at 478-82.
188. SAx, supra note 115, at 482 (cited with approval in Paepcke v.
Public Building Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330, 337, 263 N.E.2d 11, 16 (1970).
189. Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 14, 29, 312 A.2d 86, 94
(1973):
We hold that Section 27 was intended to allow the normal devel-
opment of property in the Commonwealth, while at the same time
constitutionally affixing a public trust concept to the management
of public natural resources of Pennsylvania. The result of our
holding is a controlled development of resources rather than no
development. Id.
(The above decision was announced too late for inclusion in the text).
See SAX, supra note 115, at 478-82.
190. Nichols v. City of Rock Island, 3 Ill.2d 531, 535, 121 N.E.2d 799,
803 (1954); State v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 117, 81 N.W.2d
71, 73 (1957); Laird v. Pittsburgh, 205 Pa. 1, 5-6, 54 A. 324, 325 (1903).
191. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 424-27,
215 N.E.2d 114, 125-26 (1966).
of judicial review which broadens the base of governmental deci-
sion making, thereby tending to work a "democraticization" of the
governmental process.1 92 As a result the public trust is better
served while at the same time the philosophical basis of demo-
cratic government is preserved. 9
To achieve this result the court cannot be bound to a rigid
formula of judicial review. 94 Rather it should reserve unto itself
the freedom to inquire into the process of decision making which
led to the issue litigated. If it is sufficiently representative of the.
public interest the decision should be upheld as conforming to the
public trust. 95 But if the inquiry reveals that a sufficiently broad
segment of the public interest was denied a voice in the decision
then remedial measures should be taken.
96
The remedial measures employed by the courts preserve the
basic concept that decisions concerning the public interest are to
be made by the duly elected governmental bodies or their desig-
nated representatives rather than the courts.19 7 However, by re-
arranging the burden of proof,!" by requiring the decision
maker to listen to a broader range of views, 99 and by requiring
decisions to be made at a level of government commensurate with
the effect of the decision on the public,2 00 the courts have given
effect to the public trust.
29 '
Although Pennsylvania courts have not been active in judi-
cially expanding the public trust doctrine, the courts have given
effect to the public trust in cases where the land was dedicated
to public use by a municipal ordinance or by a deed or devise
which restricted the permissible use of land.20 2  In such cases,
192. SAX, supra note 115, at 559:
The closer a court can come to thrusting decision making upon a
truly representative body---such as by requiring a legislature to
determine an issue openly and explicitly the less a court will in-
volve itself in the merits of a controversy. This relationship sug-
gests that democratization is essentially the function which the
courts perceive themselves as performing....
193. SAx, supra note 115, at 559.
194. See notes 195-201 and accompanying text infra.
195. E.g., State v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 116, 81 N.W.2d
71, 73-74 (1957).
196. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 422, 215
N.E.2d 114, 123 (1966) (decision of Commission to lease public lands for
purposes of building a ski slope reversed, the court stating that a decision
involving such a major change in use of public lands could only be made
by the state legislature).
197. See note 192 supra.
198. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 424-27,
215 N.E.2d 114, 125-26 (1966).
199. E'g., Abbot v. Comm'rs, 357 Mass. 784, 785, 260 N.E.2d 142, 143
(1970).
200. E.g., Town of Brookline v. Metropolitan District Comm'n, 357
Mass. 435, 440, 258 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1970). Compare Muench v. Public
Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 515, 53 N.W.2d 514, 524 (1952) with Menzer
v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d 70, 80-81, 186 N.W.2d 290, 297 (1971).
201. See cases cited notes 197-200 supra.
202. See cases cited notes 205-24 infra.
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"the classic notion of a trust is most accurate, for the government
actually serves in the capacity of a trustee to carry out the wishes
of the donor. 20 - These cases should provide useful precedent for
the courts in applying the doctrine to all of "Pennsylvania's public
natural resources.
20 4
Several cases clearly illustrate that lands subject to the public
trust are not forever limited to past uses. In Bernstein v. Pitts-
burgh,20 5 300 acres of land had been conveyed to the city of Pitts-
burgh for use as a "Public Park and place of free, attractive and
healthful resort, and open air recreation for the people . . and
perpetually keeping and maintaining the same for such uses . ..
and for no other use or purpose whatever. ' 20 6 The city proposed
to build an amphitheater in the park which would, together with
parking, occupy fourteen acres of the parkland. Two taxpayers
sued, claiming the city, as trustees, were acting in violation of the
trust. The court recognized that such trusts are to be strictly con-
strued but held that such a use was within the terms of the
trust.2
07
While the entire park acreage or any substantial part of it
cannot, of course, be built upon so as unduly to destroy
the enjoyment of fresh air, sunshine and exercise, the erec-
tion within its borders of monuments, museums, art gal-
leries, public libraries, zoological and botanical gardens,
conservatories, and the like, is commonly recognized and
accepted as being within the normal scope and ambit of
public park purposes, and an open-air public auditorium
comes within the same category ... .208
That patrons of some of these uses may be required to pay admis-
sion was not considered by the court to be important.
20 9
In Shields v. Philadelphia,210 a testatrix devised one and one-
third acres of land to the city for a public park. The city appro-
priated money for the construction of a little league baseball field
on the park, which would occupy about one-half of the area. The
majority of the court held that such use was within the terms of
the trust.21 1 However, a dissenting opinion believed that the use
of so great an area of a small plot of land was not justified.212 The
203. SAX, supra note 115, at 483.
204. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 27.
205. Bernstein v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 200, 77 A.2d 452 (1951).
206. Id. at 203, 77 A.2d at 454.
207. Id. at 206, 77 A.2d at 455.
208. Id. at 206-07, 77 A.2d at 455.
209. Id. at 207, 77 A.2d at 456. See Cohen v. Samuel, 367 Pa. 268,
272, 80 A.2d 732, 734 (1951).
210. Shields v. Philadelphia, 405 Pa. 600, 176 A.2d 697 (1962).
211. Id. at 603, 176 A.2d at 698.
212. Id. at 604, 176 A.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion).
case would seem to push this aspect of the trust doctrine to the
permissible outer limits.
Where the trust arises from public use rather than by any ex-
press trust document, the permissible uses seem to be even broader.
In Bruker v. Carlisle Borough,213 the majority of the court held
that part of a public square which had been used for a public mar-
ket for 200 years could properly be used as a site for other public
buildings.
214
Whenever property is dedicated in merely general terms
to public use such use necessarily varies with the changing
circumstances, customs and requirements of city life, and
is therefore subject from itme to time to determination by
the proper legal authorities, subject, of course, to ultimate
judicial control as to legality. 215
However two justices dissented because they felt the city was not
entitled to totally abolish the prior use.2 16 In this respect the dis-
sent was in accord with some other jurisdictions which view with
disfavor any new use which eliminates prior public uses2 17  In
this situation the dissent would seem to espouse the better public
policy.
Although Pennsylvania courts seem tolerant to changing uses
of trust property, they are very skeptical of attempts to alienate it.
In Trustees of the Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania,218 the City of Philadelphia attempted to
convey to the University of Pennsylvania lands which had been
previously dedicated for "use as a public park forever. ' '219 The
Supreme Court held the attempted alienation void as a violation of
the trust:
The city holds, subject to the trusts, in favor of the com-
munity and is but the conservator of the title in the soil
and has neither power nor authority to sell and convey the
same for private purposes .... 220
This principle was affirmed in Hoffman v. Pittsburgh,2 21
where the court denied the City of Pittsburgh's claim that it could
convey fee simple title to a public square, even if it applied the
proceeds to another public use. The court stated:
[I] t is the property itself which is vested in them for pub-
213. Bruker v. Carlisle Borough, 376 Pa. 330, 102 A.2d 418 (1954).
214. Id. at 338, 102 A.2d at 421.
215. Id. (citations omitted).
216. Id. at 339, 102 A.2d at 422.
217. See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 419,
215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (1966).
218. Trustees of the Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 251 Pa. 115, 96 A. 123 (1915).
219. Id. at 124, 96 A. at 125.
220. Id. at 124-25, 96 A. at 125. See also In re Bangor Park Ass'n,
370 Pa. 442, 444, 88 A.2d 769, 772 (1952); Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Pa.
186, 191 (1850).
221. Hoffman v. Pittsburgh, 365 Pa. 386, 75 A.2d 649 (1950).
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lic uses, and to no private use can they possibly apply it.
Their power over it is restricted and circumscribed; it is
not theirs to sell or to dispose of; they may control it
within their right, and designate the use, but can go no
further .... 222
However, these general statements prohibiting any alienation
of the land are too broad, and the facts of other cases reveal that
under certain conditions even trust property may be alienated.
223
In Goodman Appea, 224 a township had dedicated certain lands
"for park and recreation purposes." 221 Later, in 1966, the town-
ship commissioners passed a resolution authorizing its sale. Good-
man soon after offered $125,000 for the property, which eventually
was refused. Two months later they agreed to sell to one Ac-
chione for $100,000, subject to court approval. Goodman protested,
renewing his offer at $125,000. Eventually the township obtained
the approval of the court of common pleas, which was aware of
Goodman's higher offer, to sell to Acchione at $100,000. However,
apparently having some reservations, Acchione said he would pay
$125,000 for the land. The next day the township deeded the land
to Acchione. No public notice of the contemplated sale was given
and no public hearings were held. The court first recognized that
under certain conditions a municipality may dispose of trust prop-
erty.223 However, the court reversed the decree, set aside the deed
to Acchione and declared the title to be in the township.227 "The
concatenation of circumstances surrounding this entire transaction
casts grave doubt on the good faith of the Township in this trans-
action."
22
Attempted conveyances of trust property under similar cir-
cumstances have also been voided by the courts.
229
All of these cases demonstrate that no hard and fast rule can
successfully be applied to judicial review of actions involving the
public trust doctrine. 2 0 However, from these and other cases,
222. Id. at 393, 75 A.2d at 652.
223. E.g., Palmerton Borough v. Palmerton Area School Dist., 25 Pa.
D. & C.2d 525 (Carbon Co. 1961).
224. Goodman Appeal, 425 Pa. 23, 227 A.2d 816 (1967).
225. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 818.
226. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 820. In this case the procedure for sale
was established by statute (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1561 (1964)).
227. Goodman Appeal, 425 Pa. 23, 36, 227 A.2d 816, 823 (1967).
228. Id. at 33, 227 A.2d at 822.
229. Heilig Bros. Co. v. Kohler, 366 Pa. 72, 79-80, 76 A.2d 613, 617
(1950) (" [T]he entire transaction was conducted with extreme haste and
with great secrecy." Id. at 80); In re Bangor Park Ass'n, 370 Pa. 442, 446,
88 A.2d 769, 773 (1952).
230. See notes 195-96 and accompanying text supra.
some relevant factors in ruling on any proposed use seem to be:
(1) the degree of public control over any use; (2) availability of
the new use to the public in general; (3) the actual present public
use of the property; (4) the relative effect on the prior uses of any
change in use; (5) the total area affected; and (6) the degree of
public involvement in the decision making.28 1
In any attempt to invoke the public trust doctrine, the advice
of Professor Sax may be considered: "If lawyers and their clients
are willing to ask for less than the impossible, the judiciary can be
expected to play an increasingly important and fruitful role in
safeguarding the public trust."
28 2
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A LIMIT
ON PRIVATE ACTIONS
The Supreme Court decision in the Gettysburg Tower case
strongly implies that the court will entertain suits brought by the
Commonwealth to enjoin purely private acts which allegedly vio-
late the public trust.23 3  Such actions could arise from two dis-
tinct fact situations.
First, the private party may have been the beneficiary of a
governmental action adverse to the public trust.2 4  This could
take many forms. The government could have deeded public lands
231. See Paepcke v. Public Building Comm'n, 46 Il1.2d 330, 343, 263
N.E.2d 11, 19 (1970); State v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 116,
81 N.W.2d 71, 73 (1957). In Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 14,
312 A.2d 86 (1973), a decision published too late for inclusion in the text
of this comment, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the widening of a street
through a 27 acre river common long dedicated to public use, asserting
that such development violated the public trust doctrine imposed by the
Environmental Rights Amendment. After finding that reasonable efforts
were taken by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation to mini-
mize environmental harm; that public hearings had been held; that various
other state agencies had been consulted; and that the widening of the high-
way would only take one-half acre of the common and would not alter the
basic nature of the area, the court held the action did not violate the
public trust doctrine. The court stated:
Judicial review ... must be realistic and not merely legalistic.
The court's role must be to test the decision under review by a
threefold standard: (1) Was there compliance with all applicable
statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the Common-
wealth's public natural resources? (2) Does the record demon-
strate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incrusion to
a minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm which will result
from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the
benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would
be an abuse of discretion?
Id. at 29-30, 312 at 94.
232. SAX, supra note 115, at 566.
233. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 206-08, 311 A.2d 588, 595-96 (1973) (concurring opinion, where-
in two justices felt the Commonwealth has always possessed this power, and
dissenting opinion wherein two additional justices felt the duty and power
was imposed by PA. CowsT. art. I, § 27).
234. See cases cited note 239 infra.
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to a special interest group without there being any significant
benefit to the public;23 5 a department may have granted a waiver
of an otherwise enforceable regulation, for example one which
allowed an industry to pollute air or water;23 6 or a commission
may authorize condemnation of land which has other important
environmental qualities protected by Section 27.287
In such cases the action should focus on the validity of the
private right granted in the first instance. Therefore, the court
should approach the issue much like it would governmental ac-
tions which violate the public trust.238 The court could reject ar-
guments concerning confiscation by finding the defendant was
merely being denied that which he was not entitled to anyway.2 9
On the other hand the case could be free of any taint of gov-
ernmental impropriety. Actions against private individuals in such
cases are not without precedent, 240 and will likely be allowed in
the future where such actions allege injury to the public trust
property.241 As stated by Justice Holmes of the United States Su-
preme Court in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.:242
The caution with which demands of this sort, on the part
of a state, for relief from injuries analogous to torts, must
be examined is dwelt upon in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496 .... But it is plain that some such demands must be
recognized, if the grounds alleged are proved.
24 3
As Justice Holmes implied, the burden of proof in such cases
will be much more difficult for the state to overcome. Generally,
the remedy sought will be an injunction.244 In order to justify
235. See Goodman Appeal, 425 Pa. 23, 29, 227 A.2d 816, 821 (1967).
236. No case precisely on point was found; however, in Commonwealth
v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973), the Department of En-
vironmental Resources denied two coal companies' requests for permits to
pump polluted mine drainage into surface waterways. The Common-
wealth Court reversed, finding no legal reason for denying the permits.
On appeal the Supreme Court reinstated the Department's ruling, finding
that the statutes gave the commission the power to withhold the permits.
In its opinon, the court stated, "In addition we cannot ignore Article I,
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution .... There cannot be any
doubt that an overriding public interest in acid mine drainage pollution
does exist." Id. at 94, 306 A.2d at 317.
237. E.g., Application of Philadelphia Electric Company, 44 Pa. PUC
579 (1970).
238. See notes 205-32 and accompanying text supra.
239. See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 388-89 (1892);
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 92, 306 A.2d 308, 316-17
(1973); Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Pa. 186, 192 (1850).
240. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
241. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 237.
244. E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
such a grant the plaintiff must first prove injury by clear and
convincing evidence, 245 and secondly, that great rather than merely
some injury will result.240 Additionally, as stated by the Common-
wealth Court:
We cannot construe Article I, Section 27 as removing equi-
ty's immemorial duty to weigh in its conscience the effect
upon the defendant of a decree, even where the plaintiff's
right has been established.2 47
In Gettysburg, the Commonwealth sued a private corporation
alleging irreparable injury would result to the historic values of
the Gettysburg National Military Park if the 307 foot high tower
was constructed on the private land of the defendant.2 48  Standing
to sue was based on the Commonwealth's duties as public trustee
under the Environmental Rights Amendment. 249 Therefore, it
seems clear that the Commonwealth based its suit on the public
trust doctrine as created by the amendment.250 Yet the doctrine
is a property concept which deals with the permissible uses of pub-
lic property. 251 Therefore, to accept the Commonwealth's claim
in Gettysburg as a proper assertion of the public trust as created
by the amendment, it would seem necessary to accept concepts
such as historic values as public property rights; otherwise there
would not appear to be any trust res.212
It is submitted that a difference in opinion among the Justices
of the Supreme Court as to whether the natural, scenic, historic
and aesthetic values should be so regarded was the major reason
why the court could not reach unanimous agreement in the case.
It seems that the opinion of the Court did not regard the values
as property rights, but instead regarded them as personal rights
only.2 52  Under such a view, the public trust concept would not
seem appropriate.22 4 Rather the Commonwealth's suit would seem
to be an exercise of the police power of the State, in which case
the United States Constitutional requirements of due process and
equal protection would not seem to be met because it would in ef-
fect amount to spot zoning.255 On the other hand, the concurring
and dissenting opinions (which together represent a majority of
245. E.g., Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 231, 247, 302 A.2d 886, 894 (1973).
246. Id. at 248, 302 A.2d at 894-95.
247. Id. at 248-49, 302 A.2d at 895 (citations omitted). See Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (implying the state would
not be held to as strict a burden of proof as would a private citizen).
248. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 195, 311 A.2d 588, 589 (1973).
249. Id. at 197, 311 A.2d at 591.
250. Id.
251. See notes 166-80 and accompanying text supra.
252. Id.
253. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 201, 311 A.2d 588, 592 (1973).
254. See notes 166-80 and accompanying text supra.
255. See notes 117-20 and accompanying text supra.
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the court) appear to regard the values as public property, in which
case the public trust concept as imposed by the amendment would
seem proper.
25 6
Considering the rapid rate at which Pennsylvania's landscape
is being despoiled, the latter view would seem to have many merits
in today's society. However, since the second sentence of the
amendment states only that "Pennsylvania's public natural re-
sources are the common property of all the people," 257 and does
not specifically include the values enumerated in the first sentence,
it is questionable whether such a view can be supported on the
basis of the amendment alone.258 There is, however, some case
law tending to support the view that natural and historic values
are part of the public property.
25 9
Even if the values enumerated in the first were not consid-
ered to be within the scope of the public trust, a private land-
owner would not seem to be insulated from suits based on that
doctrine. For example, if the Tower Corporation had constructed
a large industrial factory which polluted the air which drifted over
the battlefield, then there would still be an injury to two pres-
ently cognizable property rights. The first would be the resulting
injury to the land in the park;26 0 the second would be the pollu-
tion of the air itself.2 1 Air belongs to all the people and cannot
be appropriated by anyone.262 Since it is a property right the state
may properly demand that it not be harmed.263 The landowner
256. See notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra.
257. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
258. See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra. From the lan-
guage of the amendment itself, such a result is not clearly indicated.
Furthermore, the legislative history would not seem helpful (see note
176 supra). It is submitted that the values enumerated in the first sen-
tence cannot be incorporated into the second, and that the values can be
included within the public trust only if they are considered a part of
Pennsylvania's public natural resources based on precedent. See note 259
infra.
259. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Power, Inc.,
454 Pa. 193, 206, 311 A.2d 588, 595 (1973) (concurring opinion). In Snyder
v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 125 Ohio St. 336, 181 N.E. 483 (1932), the court
stated:
[W]e .. .are of the opinion that, to the extent to which a given
area possesses elements or features which supply a human need and
contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and
are essential for the well being of such a community and the
proper enjoyment of its property devoted to park and recreational
purposes, the same constitute natural resources.
Id. at 339, 181 N.E.at 484.
260. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
261. Id.
262. See BROUGHTON, supra note 42, at 426.
263. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
should not be heard to complain since a basic legal principle is
that he must use his land so as not to injure the property of oth-
ers.
26 4
V. WHETHER THE CITIZENS' ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS COULD
SUPPORT A CAUSE OF ACTION IN TORT
Where property rights are concerned, the courts will likely
restrict the use of private land when it is clearly proved that ir-
reparable harm to public trust property will result. It is also pos-
sible that the courts could recognize similar suits broughts by pri-
vate citizens where it is alleged that there is personal injury to
their environmental rights.
Traditionally, the public trust has recognized the right of citi-
zen groups, as beneficiaries of the trust to bring an action against
the government for waste of the trust property.265 In fact such
actions are one of the primary advantages to the public trust con-
cept.2
60
Yet he may have suffered unique harm to his environmental
rights of a kind different from the public, or strictly private harm
not really within the public interest. In such cases the public
trust would not be involved. Where the acts caused injury to his
property, he would often be able to sue in nuisance.267 However,
there may be cases where he suffers private injury without ac-
tually having any of his property damaged. In such cases, it is
submitted that the first sentence of the amendment could support
a cause of action in tort.
Traditionally, constitutional rights have been considered as re-
strictions only on state actions.26 8 Yet, when the Bill of Rights
was ratified the common law adequately protected the enumerated
values from violation by their fellow citizens. 269 Actions of tres-
pass and ejectment, for example, protected not only the right to
own and use property but also allowed persons to assemble to-
gether for religious or political purposes.270 In fact, to a large ex-
tent, the Bill of Rights protected from governmental interference
that which was already protected from private invasion.
271
The inference in such an analysis then is not that constitu-
tional rights are merely restrictions on governmental actions, but
that there are certain private rights which deserve protection, both
from the government and its citizenry.
264. See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 231, 234, 302 A.2d 886, 887 (1973).
265. Bruker v. Carlisle Borough, 376 Pa. 330, 333, 102 A.2d 418, 419
(1954).
266. SA x, supra note 115, at 474 n.14.
267. See cases cited notes 78, 81 supra.
268. See BROUGHTON, supra note 46, at 435.





This conclusion is not without support. First, private use of
property is already limited to some extent by the traditional Bill
of Rights. 27 2 The freedom of speech may require the owner of a
shopping center to allow others to picket.273 A migrant worker's
fundamental constitutional rights may require a farm owner to
allow social workers to enter upon his land.
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More significantly, the federal government and some states
have found within their constitutions the right to privacy, and
have also recognized a cause of action based on the violation of
that right by private citizens. 27 5 "Whenever a right exists, . . . rec-
ognizable by law, a violation of that right will be prohibited.
"270
Additional support for a private cause of action can be found
in Pennsylvania law.277 In Erdnmn v. Mitchell,27 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had before it a case in which the defendants, mem-
bers of a trade union, called a strike solely to coerce their employer
to either fire the plaintiffs, who were working on the same project,
or to force them to join the defendants' union. The defendants
threatened similar action at other sites. The plaintiffs sought an
injunction to restrain such activity. After first finding that the
defendant had committed no statutory offense, and that the legis-
lature had practically abolished the common law writ of conspir-
acy, the court, discussing the first article of the constitution, stated:
"... all men have certain inherent and indefeasible
rights, among which are ... acquiring, possessing and
protecting property. . . ." This clause . . . needs no af-
firmative legislation . . . for its enforcement in the civil
courts. Wherever a court of common pleas can be reached
by the citizen these great and essential principles of free
government must be recognized and vindicated by that
court .... Nor does it need statutory authority to frame
its decrees or statutory process to enforce them....
... This is one of the rights guaranteed him by our
"Declaration of Rights" . . . and one which it is the
272. See cases cited notes 273-74 infra.
273. Amalgamated Food Employers Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 314-16 (1967).
274. State v. Shark, 58 N.J. 297, 302, 277 A.2d 369, 371-72 (1969).
275. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963); Galella v. Onassis,
353 F. Supp. 196, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Dietman v. Time, 284 F. Supp. 925,
929 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
276. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), citing
Clemons v. Bd. of Educ., 228 F.2d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
277. Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 90-91, 56 A. 327, 331 (1903).
278. Id.
bounden duty of the courts to protect. 279
The new Environmental Rights Amendment confers rights on
the people; by the basic philosophy of the courts there should also
be a remedy when such rights are violated. 28 0 But if and when
such an action is recognized, the plaintiff will also have to be pre-
pared to meet the traditional burden of proof required by equity
before relief will be granted.2 8
CONCLUSION
The possible effects of the Environmental Rights Amendment
are many and varied. The extent to which any of these become
part of Pennsylvania law depends largely on whether the courts
hold either of its provisions to be self-executing.
Very likely the courts will find that the first sentence of the
amendment created new and important rights in the people which
are not to be abridged by an overreaching government. Addi-
tionally, there is sufficient precedent on which the court could
sustain a private cause of action based on the invasion of one's
environmental rights.
Yet one of the most significant effects of the amendment
should be the imposition of the public trust doctrine on the man-
agement of Pennsylvania's public natural resources. In implement-
ing this doctrine, however, the courts will surely not assume the
role of the supreme arbitrators of the public interest. Rather,
the courts will strive for a democratization of the decision making
process.
Suits against private persons based on the public trust doc-
trine will also likely be allowed. Actions such as that involved in
Gettysburg would seem to be a proper application of that doctrine
only if natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values are consid-
ered public property. Otherwise, the suit would be an exercise
of the police power, in which case the action would amount to
spot zoning and violate due process and equal protection.
The lawsuit which provided the initial testing ground for Ar-
ticle I, Section 27 is over. Despite what initially would seem to be
an environmental defeat, the implications are strong that if the
amendment were applied to the proper situations, especially where
governmental actions are involved, it could provide an effective




281. See notes 244-47 and accompanying text supra.
